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Fig. 6a, First generation for N=101, s=1
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Fig. 6b, Last generation for N=101, s=1
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Fig. 7c σ2/N vs. generation for m=3
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Fig. 7b <Db> vs. generation for m=3
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Evolution in Minority Games
I.  Games with a Fixed Strategy Space
Yi Li, Rick Riolo and Robert Savit
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Abstract
In this paper we study the minority game in the presence of evolution.  In particular, we examine
the behavior in games in which the dimension of the strategy space, m, is the same for all agents
and fixed for all time.  We find that for all values of m, not too large, evolution results in a
substantial improvement in overall system performance.  We also show that after evolution, results
obey a scaling relation among games played with different values of m and different numbers of
agents, analogous to that found in the non-evolutionary, adaptive games.  Best system performance
still occurs, for a given number of agents, at mc, the same value of the dimension of the strategy
space as in the non-evolutionary case, but system performance is now nearly an order of magnitude
better than the non-evolutionary result.  For m<mc, the system evolves to states in which average
agent wealth is better than in the random choice game, despite (and in some sense because of) the
persistence of maladaptive behavior by some agents.  As m gets large, overall systems performance
approaches that of the random choice game.
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2I. Introduction and Background
In many biological and social systems agents compete for limited resources.  In such systems, it is
often the case that the most successful agents are those which act in ways that are distinct from
their competitors.  Thus, firms which bring new innovations to the market before their competitors
are often rewarded, commuters traveling to work at times when the roads are not crowded spend
less time and emotional energy traveling, and foraging animals who find an uncrowded plot of land
are rewarded by easier access to more food.
One attempt to understand the general underlying dynamics of systems in which agents seek to be
different has focused on the analysis of a class of simple games which have come to be known as
"minority games".1,2,3,4  In the simplest version of these games, agents use heterogeneous sets of
strategies (in general, different strategies for different agents) to choose, at each time step of the
game, to join one of two groups (labeled, say, by 0 or 1).  Agents are rewarded if they are in the
minority group at a given time step.  The most fully studied versions of these games have been
adaptive, in that each agent can choose to play a different strategy from his assigned set of
strategies at different times in the game.  But these games have not been evolutionary, since an
agent’s individual set of strategies is fixed for the entire game.  Evolution, in the broad sense of the
appearance of new strategies, is, however, seminally important in the dynamics of complex
adaptive systems.  In this paper we will include evolutionary effects, and study games in which
those agents that perform poorly can try new strategies.
To begin, we will first summarize the structure and basic results of the adaptive, non-evolutionary
minority game.  In these games, the agents make their choice (to join group 0 or group 1) by
following the prediction of a strategy.  Strategies make their predictions by using information
drawn from a set of common, publicly available information provided to all the agents at each time
step.  In the simplest case, those data may be drawn from a single time series.  For example, one
commonly used set of publicly available information (and the one that is used in the cases reported
in this paper) is the list of which were the minority groups for the most recent past m time steps.
Thus, a strategy is a look-up table with 2 columns and a number of rows. The left hand column
contains a list of all possible common signals that the strategy can receive at a given time step of
the game.  For each such signal, the right hand column contains a 0 or 1 which is that strategy's
prediction of which will be the minority group in response to the given signal.  For the case in
which the strategies use the most recent m minority groups as signals, each strategy table contains
2m rows, corresponding to the 2m possible sequences of m 0's and 1's.
3At the beginning of the game, each agent is randomly assigned s such strategies (in general,
different, random sets of strategies for different agents).  At each time step of the game, an agent
must choose which of his s strategies to use.  In the simplest versions of the game, each agent, at
each time step computes how well each of his s strategies would have done at predicting the correct
minority group for all times from the beginning of the game.  He then chooses to use that strategy
that is currently doing the best.  Ties among strategies may be broken in a variety of ways, the
simplest being a random choice among the tied strategies.  The most intensively studied version of
the game is one in which the agents maintain the same strategies during the entire game.  Since
each agent can choose from among his s strategies the game is adaptive.  But the game is not
evolutionary, since the strategies are fixed for the duration of the game.
These adaptive, non-evolutionary games, in which all agents have strategies with the same value of
m has been studied by several groups2,3,4,5,6, and the general structure of the game under these
conditions is fairly well understood.  Such games show a remarkable phase structure in which there
is emergent coordination among the agents for a range of values of m.  The system-wide behavior
can be summarized by considering, σ, the standard deviation of the number of agents belonging to
group 1.  The smaller σ, the larger a typical minority group will be, and thus, the more points will
be awarded to the agents in toto.   In Fig. 1 we plot σ2/N as a function of z≡2m/N on a log-log scale
for various N and m with s=2.  (Scaling curves also exist for other values of s.  They are similar in
structure to that shown in this figure, but differ in some details.3)  We see first that all the data fall
on a universal curve.  The minimum of this curve is near 2mc/N≡zc≅0.5, and separates two different
phases7.  For z<zc, the system is in a maladaptive phase in which there is no information available
to the agents’ strategies that can help them predict which will be the next minority group.  All the
information has been traded away.  We call this phase “strategy efficient”.  The consequence of this
efficiency is that the agents’ choices tend to be maladaptive, so that the system-wide performance is
very poor.  For z≥zc, there is information available to the agents’ strategies, and we see an emergent
coordination among the agents’ choices which results in improved system-wide utilization of
resources.  The best emergent coordination occurs at z=zc when the dimension of the strategy space
from which the agents draw their strategies is on the order of the number of agents playing the
game.  As z increases beyond zc, (e.g. as m increases beyond mc for fixed N), system-wide
performance degrades and σ approaches the value it would have in the random choice game
(RCG), in which agents randomly and independently choose group 0 or group 1 with equal
probability.  A full description of the dynamics of the non-evolutionary game can be found in Ref.
3.
4When one introduces evolutionary effects, thereby allowing the agents’ strategies to change as the
game proceeds, the results change substantially.  Evolutionary games may be classed into two
categories: 1. Those games in which all agents respond to the same aspects of the publicly available
information, ie., to the same set of signals.  In the context of the games discussed here, this amounts
to a game in which all strategies in play have the same value of m.  Agents may alter their
strategies under selective pressure, but may not change the m value of their strategies.  2. Games in
which different agents respond to different aspects of the publicly available information.  In the
context of the games discussed here, this can be most easily implemented by considering games in
which different agents have strategies with different values of m.  In such games agents may or
may not be allowed to change the m-value of their strategies under selective pressure.
In this paper we will discuss the first case.  The second case will be discussed in a companion
paper.8  In that work we will see that allowing agents to change the m value of their strategies
introduces an interesting, somewhat counter-intuitive new twist to the system.  In particular, we
will show that the system generally evolves to a state characterized by step function distribution of
wealth per agent as a function of m, in which the step transition occurs at a value of m=mt.  Agents
with m<mt are relatively wealthy, and agents with m>mt are relatively poor.  We will also show
that mt≈mc-1.
In the next section we will describe the evolutionary algorithms and the general, system-wide
results in the fixed m games..  For all values of m, not too large, we will see that evolution results
in a marked improvement over merely adaptive dynamics, although the best utilization of resources
is still at m=mc, as in the strictly adaptive case. In Section III we will study the resulting
evolutionary dynamics in more detail, and will provide explanations for the general results
presented in Section II.  We will also show that the evolutionary dynamics is somewhat different
for m>mc and for m<mc. The paper ends with a discussion and summary in Section IV.
II. Evolutionary Dynamics and General Results
A. The Evolutionary Algorithm
We now consider the case in which all strategies have the same value of m.  As in the non-
evolutionary case, the game begins with N agents randomly assigned s strategies each, of memory
m.  We also create a random initial history of minority groups of length m+1 so that strategies can
be initially evaluated.
5We now must specify the evolutionary dynamics.  There are many different ways to define
evolution consistent with the notion of selective pressure.  We have chosen to look at several which
are associated with removal of poorly performing strategies.  We have not incorporated effects such
as incremental mutation or reproduction, although that can easily be done in this context.  As we
shall explain here and in section III, we find that some central features of our results are
independent of the details of the evolutionary processes we have studied.  We believe that these
features may be yet more general.
To evolve our system, we define a time, τ, which is the duration of one generation.  During τ time
steps, the agents' strategies do not change.  At the end of τ time steps, we rank the agents by wealth
accumulated during that generation (i.e., how many times they have been in the minority group).
We define a “poor” agent to be one whose wealth is in the lowest percentile, p, of agent wealth.
We call p the  "poverty level".  We randomly choose half the agents whose wealth ranks in the
lowest p percent, and replace their s strategies with s new, randomly chosen strategies.  In the
games discussed in this section, all strategies, including the new replacement strategies have the
same value of m.  (In the games discussed in a companion paper8, we will allow the replacement
strategies to have different values of m.)  Those agents whose strategies are not replaced, maintain
the relative scores of their strategies from one generation to the next.  Agents receiving new
strategies have the scores of these new strategies initially set to zero.  The game is played for an
additional τ time steps, and the evolutionary process is repeated.  In most of the results reported in
this section, each agent has s=2 strategies, τ =10,000 time steps, and p is set so that the
impoverished group is defined as either the poorest 10%, 20% or 40% of the population.  We will
also briefly present results for games played with s=1.  This allows us to explore the effects of
evolution without adaptivity.  Using these parameter ranges, we have studied a variety of games
with N=101, 201, 401, and 801 agents run for a total of between 200 and 600 generations.
B.  General Results
1.  s>1
In this paper we will primarily discuss the case s=2.  Other values of s>1 are similar, but differ in
some details, similar to the non-evolutionary case.3   In Fig. 2 we present σ2/N as a function of m
for games played with N=101 agents and p=20%.  For each value of m, eight independent runs
were performed.  Each generation was 10,000 time steps, and each game was run until σ2/N was
sensibly constant up to fluctuations, generally, 200 generations.  The reported values of σ2/N
represent an average over the final 50 generations of each run.  The horizontal dashed line in this
figure is the result σ2/N would have for the random choice game (RCG), in which each agent
chooses to join group 0 or 1, randomly and independently with equal probability.  This figure
6resembles Fig. 1 in that i.) σ2/N is a minimum around for m near mc (in this case, near 5), and ii.)
σ2/N approaches the RCG as m gets large9.  In addition, the spread in values of σ2/N for different
runs with a given m is noticeably larger for m<mc than for m≥mc similar to the behavior in the non-
evolutionary case.2,3.
However, there are some important differences.  First, the values of σ2/N are generally much lower
in Fig. 2 than in the non-evolutionary case, Fig. 1.  Most strikingly, σ2/N is less than the value for
the RCG for m<mc, in marked contrast to the non-evolutionary case.  It turns out that, in the low-m
phase, evolution is able to provide a pathway to improved system performance, while still
maintaining the quality of strategy-efficiency seen in the purely adaptive, non-evolutionary case.
We shall describe below how this comes about.  The value of σ2/N near mc is also remarkably
small, being about 1/10 of the value of the RCG.  For N=101 agents, this value of σ2/N means that,
typically, the minority group is 50 agents half the time, and 49 agents the other half.  This is clearly
quite close to optimal and is achieved by emergent control, not by explicit top-down control.
Moreover, the result is robust, varying little from one generation to the next, even though 10% of
the agents are replaced after each generation.  Notice also that the spread in the values of σ2/N for
m=mc is very small, differing among the runs we have performed only in the third decimal place.
These results also have a remarkable scaling property analogous to the scaling results of the
adaptive, non-evolutionary case.2,3 In Fig. 3 we plot σ2/N as a function of z≡2m/N for a range of
values of m and N.  In this figure, each point represents an average of σ2/N over 16 runs with the
same values m and N.  The poverty level used in all these runs is p=20%.  For all values of z, the
scaling is quite good, although there is some spread in the results for z<zc≡2mc/N.  This is almost
certainly a statistical effect, and follows from the fact that the spread in σ for different runs is
relatively large for z<zc, as we saw, for example in Fig. 2.
We have also studied the ways in which evolution proceeds for different values of p.  In Fig. 4 we
plot σ2/N as a function of m for games played with N=101, s=2 and various values of p.  In this
figure each point represents an average over 8 runs.  For each value of m and p, games were played
for a long enough time (generally 200 generations10) so that σ2/N reached sensibly asymptotic
behavior.  We see a systematic trend in which, generally, larger values of p are associated with
larger values of σ2/N.  For small p, there are fewer strategies replaced at each generation, and the
evolutionary improvement  proceeds more slowly.  On the other hand, as p increases, selective
pressure becomes more indiscriminate, limiting the extent to which the system can improve
coordination, leading to a larger asymptotic value of σ2/N.  In Fig. 5 we plot σ2/N as a function of
7generation for different values of p, and for m=3 and m=7.  In Fig. 5a, we see most clearly a slower
initial fall-off for small p, but an asymptotically lower value of σ2/N.
An apparent exception to this behavior is at m=5 in Fig. 4.  Here it appears that σ2/N is very nearly
independent of p.  We also note that the difference in the values of σ2/N as a function of p
decreases as m=5 is approached from both above and below.  As discussed in reference 3, the value
of mc for N=101 is about 5.2.  We speculate that at mc, σ2/N is asymptotically independent of p for
all 0<p<p*, and furthermore, that p* may be one.  The detailed nature of the evolved coordinated
state at m=mc that could give rise to this universality is unclear to us, but certainly bears further
investigation.
2. s=1
It is also interesting to consider the case in which each agent has only s=1 strategy.  This is the
situation of evolution without adaptation.  We have found that with s=1 there is no significant
change in system behavior as a result of evolution.  To see this, refer to Fig. 6 in which we plot
results for a set of games played with s=1, N=101, p=20%, and various values of m.  For each value
of m, eight independent runs were performed.  In Fig. 6a we plot σ2/N as a function of m for the
first generation (of 10,000 time steps).  Fig. 6b shows σ2/N for the 200th generation as a function of
m.  It is clear that there is no systematic difference between the performance of the system with and
without evolution.  In these games, evolution introduces new and interesting dynamics which can
have a significant effect on the performance of a system, but only if the agents are also adaptive.
Replacing poorly performing random strategies by other random strategies does not lead to real
selective pressure, unless there is some additional intra-agent dynamics.
III.  Understanding the General Results
We now want to try to understand the dynamics that gives rise to some of these general results.  To
do so, it will be important to introduce two distance measures associated with properties of
individual agents.3 One is an intra-agent distance, Dh(i), defined as the Hamming distance between
the ith agent's two strategies.  The second is a distance in "behavior space", Db(i), and may be
understood to be the average behavioral distance of the ith agent from all other agents playing the
game.  In particular, let Ti[j](um) denote the response (0 or 1) to the string, um, of the jth strategy of
agent i, and let φi(j) denote the probability that agent i uses strategy j.  Further, let P(um) be the
probability that the m-string um appears in the sequence of minority groups.  Then
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A.  The Low-m Phase
Let us first consider evolutionary dynamics in the low-m phase, m<mc.  As described in Ref. 3, in
the purely adaptive, non-evolutionary case, the system manifests maladaptive behavior in this
phase.  Typically, odd occurrences of a given m-string result in more or less, random choices by the
agents (giving rise to a minority group with a population close to 50%, within random fluctuations).
However, even occurrences of a given m-string give rise to very small minority groups:  In this
case, agents use information about the group’s last response to a given string and exhibit a herding
behavior, in which many agents join the opposite group.  Although in this phase, no agent ever
earns more than 50% of the possible points, those that do the best tend to have strategies whose
relative Hamming distances are relatively small.  Small Hamming distances means that the agent’s
strategies are relatively similar.  Thus the agent is often prevented from being able to make a
maladaptive choice.  The worst performing agents, on the other hand, have strategies whose
Hamming distances are large, thus allowing them to (maladaptively) “follow the crowd” and join
the majority group much of the time.
Although the best predictor of agent wealth in the non-evolutionary game is Hamming distance (the
smaller the better), we have found that when these systems are allowed to evolve, evolutionary
dynamics selects for two different traits.  Wealthy agents turn out to be those with either small
values of Dh(i) or large values of Db(i).  Moreover, in a low-m game, evolution proceeds in two
moderately distinct stages.  First, since the poorly performing agents are preferentially removed
from the system, one would expect evolution to lower the average Hamming distance between the
agents’ strategies.  Indeed, this is what we see.  In Fig. 7a we plot the average Hamming distance
between the agents’ two strategies as a function of generation for a game played with m=3 and
N=101.  (Results for other values of m<mc are qualitatively similar.)  We see a very clear, rapid
drop off of the average Hamming distance in the early stages of evolution, up to about 40
generations.  There is also an improvement of overall resource utilization, as can be seen in Fig. 7c
in which we plot σ2/N as a function of generation for the same run.  At the same time there is also a
relatively rapid increase in 〈Db〉 as can be seen in Fig. 7b, suggesting that agents with small Db(i)
are also selected against, even in this early stage of evolution.  In this example, the early stage
9persists for the first 40 or so generations.  Following this first stage of evolution, a second stage sets
in, in which 〈Dh〉 fluctuates without falling much further, and 〈Db〉 continues to rise slowly.  By
generation 100 or so, both 〈Db〉 and σ2/N have reached asymptotic values, within fluctuations.  The
cross-over between these two stages of evolution (in this example, at about generation 40) occurs
when σ2/N (Fig. 7c) is close to about 0.25, the value found in the RCG.  Other runs performed with
m<mc generally show evidence of this two stage evolutionary structure, although not always as
clearly as the example in Fig. 7.
1.  Period-two dynamics and the role of Dh(i).
To understand what’s going on, look at Fig. 8, in which we plot the conditional probability P(1|um),
for 1 to be the minority group following a specific string of length m for the game played with
m=3, N=101.  Fig. 8a shows P(1|um) for the first generation, and Fig. 8b shows P(1|um) for the last
generation (in theses runs, the 400th generation).  That the histogram in Fig. 8a is flat is what we
expect3, but what is remarkable is that the histogram late in evolution is also very nearly flat.  That
is, the system in the low-m phase continues to be very nearly (but not entirely) strategy-efficient,
even after evolution, but at the same time shows good system-wide performance in that σ2/N is
much smaller than in the RCG.  How does this come about?
Recall that the flat histogram in the non-evolutionary case is due to an embedded period-two
dynamics in which even occurrences of a given string result in very small minority groups.  Even
after evolution, the system in the low-m phase possesses the same period two dynamics, but the
consequence of the maladaptive, herding behavior is less dramatic, and in fact, and somewhat
ironically, leads to system-wide performance better than that of the RCG.  To see that period-two
dynamics still dominates the low-m phase, refer to Fig. 9.  Here we plot POED, the probability that
the minority group in response to an even occurrence of a string is different than the minority group
following the preceding odd occurrence of the same string, as a function of m, for games played
with N=101 agents.  We see that for m<5≈mc, POED is significantly greater than ½, indicating the
presence of significant period-two dynamics.
To understand the consequence of period-two dynamics in an evolutionary context, consider the
example run referred to in Figs. 7 and 8, with m=3, N=101.  Note, first, from Fig. 7a, that late in the
evolution, the average Hamming distance has dropped to about 2.75.11  This means that, on
average, an agent’s two strategies differ in their responses to 2.75 out of 8 possible strings.
Therefore, typically, 5.25/8 (=65.63%) of agents must always respond to occurrences of a given
string (call it um) in the same fixed way, since both their strategies will dictate the same response.
On the other hand, if the period-two dynamics still obtains, then the remaining 34.37% of agents
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will be able to either choose randomly between the two groups in response to an odd occurrence of
um, or adapt (and, as in the non-evolutionary case, mal-adapt) to an even occurrence of um.  Now, of
the 66 or so agents whose strategies dictate the same response to um, typically, about 29 (=1/2[66–
(66)1/2]) will always join one group (say, group 0), while the remaining 37 will always join the
other group (say, group 1).  Of the remaining 34 agents, roughly half (17±2) will join each group.
Thus, in response to an odd occurrence of um in this example, group 0 will almost always be the
minority group, since 29 (fixed responses) + 17±2 (adaptive responses)<51.
Next, consider the response to an even occurrence of um.  In this case, as with the odd occurrence,
29 of 66 agents will again join group 0 and 37 will join group 1.  Of the remaining 34 agents,
roughly 22 will join group zero.  The reasoning is as follows:  If all of the remaining 34 agents
differed only in their response to um, then, by the usual arguments of period-two dynamics3, all 34
would join group 0.  However, since the average Hamming distance is about 2.75, roughly ¼ of the
34 agents differ in their response to one other string, and roughly ¾ of the 34 agents differ in their
response to two other strings.  If the even occurrence of um happens to lie between an odd and an
even occurrence of another string in which the two strategies differ, then there will be roughly a
50% probability that the relative rankings of the two strategies will be changed, in which case, the
agent will join group 1 rather than group zero.  If an agent’s strategies differ in their responses to
only one additional string, other than um, the probability of that agent joining group 1 is about 25%.
I.e., the probability of the even occurrence of um lying between an odd and even occurrence of the
other string is about 0.5, and if that happens, the a priori probability of the rankings of the two
strategies being altered is also 0.5.  A similar argument for the case in which an agent’s two
strategies differ in their response to two strings aside from um, shows that the probability of that
agent joining group 1 is about 37.5%.  Thus, out of 34 agents, about 12 will join group 1, leaving
22 to join group 0.  Consequently, in response to an even occurrence of um, about 51 agents will
join group 0, leaving 50 in the minority group.
In this example, then, we see that in response to an odd occurrence of a given m-string, the system
will almost always choose group 0 as the minority group, but with a minority group population of
about 45 (consistent with a typical random result).  But in response to even occurrences of a given
m-string, the minority group population will be usually be about 50, which is nearly optimal, and is
significantly better than random.  This leads, on average to a value of σ2/N of about 0.1.  this is
roughly consistent with the value of σ2/N at the end of the first stage of evolution (about generation
40), and within a factor of two (but see the next paragraph) of the result observed late in the
evolution of the m=3 games with 101 agents (Fig. 7b).  Note that although there is marked
improvement over the system-wide results of the RCG, the dominant dynamics of the system in the
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low m-phase is still that of period-two dynamics.  Moreover, those agents that, in response to an
even occurrence of a given m-string, join the group that was the minority group following the
previous odd occurrence of that same string are still behaving maladaptively, and are still losing
points.  This is borne out by Fig. 10a, in which we plot agent wealth versus Dh(i) every 20
generations for this example, and in Fig. 10b in which we plot the same quantity every third
generation for the first 30 generations.  We see that, even after evolution, the wealthy agents tend to
have small values of Dh(i). And it is because of the diminution of the average Hamming distance
forced by evolution that the system is able to limit the number of agents who make maladaptive
choices.  The irony is, that it is precisely during those times (i.e., in response to even occurrences of
m-strings) when a limited number of agents make maladaptive choices, that the typical population
of the minority group comes closer to 50% of the agents, lowering the average value of σ2/N, and
resulting in an improvement in the general good.
2.  The evolutionary role of Db(i).
Although the most important dynamic driving the evolutionary improvement in σ2/N for m<mc is
bound up with a decrease in 〈Dh〉 and the role of the period-two dynamics, that is not the whole
story.  The argument in the last paragraph leads to an expectation that, for m=3, N=101, σ2/N
should be about 0.1, late in evolution.   But as we see from Fig. 7b, σ2/N is about half that.  The
remaining improvement in σ2/N is related to the fact that evolution also selects against agents with
small Db.  The fact that there is an increase in 〈Db〉, relatively rapid in the early stage of evolution,
and slower in the late stage, suggests this.
To explore this a little more fully, refer to Fig. 11, in which we show a series of scatter plots of
agent wealth versus Db(i) for series of generations during evolution.  Fig. 11a shows the scatter
plots every 20 generations for 200, and Fig. 11b shows the scatter generations plots every three
generations for the first 30 generations.  Note first that in the early stages of evolution there a large
spread in Db(i).  This spread decreases during the first stage of evolution, and by generation 40 the
distribution in these plots has narrowed considerably.  By this point, most agents have values of
Db(i) between 49.5 and 51.  As evolution continues, there is an increasingly strong and clear
correlation between an agent’s wealth and his value of Db(i)12.  The large initial spread in Db(i) is
due to the small size of the available strategy space (small m), as we shall explain below.  The rapid
decrease in the spread of Db(i) during the first stage of evolution is due, largely, to selection against
agents with large values of Dh(i) and in part to selection against agents with small values of Db(i),
as we shall now explain.
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First, to understand the origin of the large spread in Db(i), refer to Fig. 12, in which we plot Db(i) as
a function of Dh(i) every 20 generation for a game played with m=3.  We see that early in the
evolution, agents with either very large or very small values of Db(i), generally have values of Dh(i)
close to 4 (i.e. close to 2m-1).  To understand this, suppose an agent’s two strategies differ in c of the
2m entries in his two strategies, so that Dh(i) is c.  Now let’s estimate Db(i) for this agent.  Consider
one of the c
 
um’s for which the agent’s strategies differ.  For simplicity, let us set φi(k) and φj(i) both
equal to ½.  The  contribution from such a um to the sum in eq. (2.2) over k, l and j, will be exactly
P(um)(N-1)/2, or, in our example, 50P(um).  This is because each T[l]j will differ from either T[1]i or
T[2]i, but not both.  Thus, an agent whose Hamming distance is 2m will have a value of Db(i) of
exactly (N-1)/2.  If c<2m, however, Db(i) will differ from 50.  Now, if both an agent’s strategies
have the same response to a given um, then the contribution of that string to Db(i)  will depend on
the specific distribution of 0’s and 1’s in the responses of the other agents’ strategies to that string.
If an agent has a relatively low value of Dh(i), then there will be many such strings contributing to
Db(i).  The mean of such contributions, averaged over many strings will be about 50, and if there
are many such strings, then we expect that the relative deviation from 50 will be fairly small.
Indeed, this is what we see in games played in the high m-phase,3 in which c is typically of order
2m-1, and in which it is very rare for c to be close to 2m.  On the other hand, if c differs from 2m by
only a few, which is not uncommon for small m, (and means that the agent has a relatively large
Hamming distance), then Db(i) will be very sensitive to the fluctuations in the distribution of 0’s
and 1’s to all agents’ strategies in response to a few m-strings.  In this case, the fluctuations in Db(i)
about 50 may be relatively large.  For the game played with m=3 and N=101, a simple estimate
shows that for agents with Hamming distances of 7, we should expect values of Db(i) in the range
of ~49.5 to ~50.5 (50±½), and for agents with Hamming distances of 4, expect values of Db(i) in
the range of ~48 to ~52 (50±2).
Selection against large values of Dh(i) also induces a narrowing in the spread of the Db(i)
distribution.  In Fig. 7a, we see that, in this example, 〈Dh〉 falls from about 4 to about 2.75 during
the first stage of evolution.  But in Fig. 12, we saw that values of Dh(i) near 4 are associated with
the extreme values of Db(i).  Thus, as more agents are driven to smaller values of Dh(i), the spread
in the values of Db(i) also narrows.
Although the most important dynamic in the early stage of evolution is selection against large Dh(i),
there is also selection against small Db(i).  We note that these are not the same effects since, as we
see from the first plot in Fig. 12, large values of Dh(i) are associated, fairly symmetrically, with
both small and large values of Db(i).  Thus, if the narrowing of the distribution of Db(i) were due
entirely to selection against high values of Dh(i), we should expect that narrowing to occur fairly
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symmetrically.  However, this is not what happens.  Look again at Fig. 11b.  We see that during the
first 20 or so generations, the distribution of Db(i) is depleted more readily on the low side than on
the high side.  Somewhat later, the distribution of values of Db(i) shrinks also from the high side.
Thus, independent selection against small values of Db(i) also occurs in the early stage of
evolution.13
In Fig. 13 we plot the standard deviation of Db(i) as a function of generation for the example we
have been discussing, with m=3.  This quantity stops its rapid decrease after about 40-50
generations.   This is about the same time at which 〈Dh〉 stops its rapid decrease, and 〈Db〉 changes
from increasing rapidly to increasing more slowly.  This marks the end of the first stage of
evolution in games with m<mc.  At this point, evolutionary selection against agents with high Dh(i)
ceases to be important, the width of the distribution values of Db(i) has narrowed considerably, and
the distribution of agent wealth versus Db(i) begins to resemble that associated with games played
in the high-m phase3.  Further evolutionary improvement in system performance now relies
primarily on selection against agents with low values of Db(i).
3.  Two wealthy groups
As a consequence of the interplay of natural selection with low-m minority dynamics, evolution
proceeds, roughly, in two stages, the first selecting against both high values of Dh(i) and low values
of Db(i), and the second further selecting against low values of Db(i).  This produces two groups of
wealthy agents with different traits, either low values of Dh(i) or high values of Db(i) when m<mc.
We can see this directly, by referring to Fig. 14.  Here we present three-dimensional scatter plots of
agent wealth versus Db(i) and Dh(i), after the first and the last generation for a typical run with
m=3, N=101.  Note, in particular, that late in evolution wealthy agents may have either a small
value of Dh(i) or a large value of Db(i), but not necessarily both.  Those with small Hamming
distance take advantage of the maladaptive behavior of a relatively small number (about 20%, in
the example above) of agents who continue to drive the period-two dynamics.  Of those agents with
larger Hamming distance, there is a subset with large distances in behavior space, whose choices
are commonly different than the majority of other agents in the game, and whose wealth is
correspondingly high.  Notice also that this group shows up late in evolution in Fig. 10a.  In later
generations, there is, in general, a general, strong, inverse relationship between wealth and Dh.  But
there is also a cluster of agents with high wealth and large Dh.  This group is most evident in the
plots of generations 141, 161, and 181.  This group does not directly rely on the period-two
dynamics for its high wealth.   Rather, they are the harbingers of the much larger population of
wealthy agents far separated in behavior space that dominate the dynamics for m≥mc, but not too
large.
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B.  The High-m Phase
Consider now the effects of evolution for m≥mc.  For these values of m, there is no maladaptive
behavior in the non-evolutionary game.  Rather there is emergent coordination leading to a better
than random utilization of resources, even in the absence of evolution.  Nevertheless, evolution
improves the situation still further.  In this case, evolution is a single stage process.  Because there
is no maladaptive behavior, agents are not selected for on the basis of the Hamming distance
between their strategies.  Rather, poorly performing agents are those for which Db(i) is relatively
small.  In Fig. 15, we plot 〈Dh〉 and 〈Db〉 as a function of generation for a game played with m=7,
N=101 and p=20%.  Here we see no systematic change in 〈Dh〉 over time, but we do see a sharp and
rapid increase in 〈Db〉 over the first five or so generations.  We have also plotted in this figure σ2/N
as a function of generation.  There a sharp and rapid  decrease in σ2/N corresponding to the rapid
increase in 〈Db〉.  This supports our picture that for m≥mc evolution selects against agents with a
small value of Db(i), forcing a more efficacious distribution of agents in behavior space, and
consequently a lower value of σ2/N.  Finally, refer to Figs. 16 and 17 in which we show scatter
plots of agent wealth versus Dh(i) and agent wealth versus Db(i), respectively, every 20 generations
for a run with m=7, N=101 and p=20%.  Unlike the corresponding plot for m=3 in Fig. 11, Fig. 16
shows no correlation, even late in the evolution between low values of Dh(i) and agent wealth.  On
the other hand, the plot of Db(i) versus agent wealth for this game (Fig. 17) is qualitatively similar
to the plot of Db(i) versus agent wealth for m=3 (Fig. 11) late in evolution, although with less
spread.  Thus, for m< mc, evolution selects both for low Dh(i) and high Db(i) reflecting the period-
two dynamics, and the sometime maladaptive behavior of various agents in the system.  For m≥mc
the period-two dynamics is not significant, and evolution selects only for large Db(i).
IV.   Summary and Discussion
Summary
In this paper we have demonstrated the following features of evolution in minority games with
fixed strategy space:
1. Evolution results in significant improvements in system-wide performance for all values of m.
For m<mc, σ2/N is markedly smaller than in the non-evolutionary game, and is, in fact, less
than the RCG value.  For m=mc, σ2/N is nearly an order of magnitude smaller than in the non-
evolutionary, adaptive version of the game.
2. After evolution, all values of σ2/N for games with different m and N (but with the same value
of p) lie on a universal curve as a function of z=2m/N.  As in the non-evolutionary case, the
minimum of the curve is at m=mc, at which point there is a phase change as a function of m.
Also as in the non-evolutionary case, the low-m phase is a (nearly) strategy-efficient phase,
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characterized by the dominance period-two dynamics.  Ironically, after evolution, it is the
maladaptive choices of a small percentage of agents that is responsible for most of the
improvement in the system-wide behavior.  The high-m phase is characterized by emergent
coordination among the agents’ choices, similar to the non-evolutionary case.  Except for very
large z, when the behavior of the system is similar to that of the non-evolutionary case and
approaches that of the RCG, the σ2/N curve is lower than in the non-evolutionary case.
3. In the low-m phase, evolution can be roughly separated into two stages.  In the first stage the
dominant dynamics is selection against agents with large values of Dh(i), although there is also
selection against agents with small values of Db(i).  The second stage of evolution is dominated
by selection against small values of Db(i).  In the high-m phase evolution proceeds in one stage,
in which there is selection against small values of Db(i).
4. The precise values of σ2/N generally depend on p, the parameter in the evolutionary algorithm
which determines the fraction of the low performing agents that adopt new strategies in each
generation.  However, it appears that the result is independent of p at m=mc.
5. For games played with one strategy per agent, evolution does not materially alter the average
behavior of the system.  In the context of these games, evolution is only effective when the
agents are already adaptive.
Discussion
It is not surprising that evolution generally improves system-wide performance.  But the degree to
which that performance is improved, and the ways in which the dynamics achieve that
improvement are surprising.  The dynamics in the low-m phase is particularly interesting.  It is
remarkable that in such a simple system one can identify distinct traits (low Dh(i) and high Db(i))
that are selected for, leading to a heterogeneous population of wealthy agents.  And the intricate
way in which evolution arranges for good collective performance, even in the presence of period-
two dynamics is fascinating.
Equally surprising is the existence of scaling behavior in these systems, even after evolution.
While evolution changes the shape of the scaling curve, it does not change the value of zc.
Although a full understanding of scaling is still lacking, it is clear that this robust property is deeply
embedded in the relationship between the geometry of the strategy space and the adaptive
competition.  In addition, the apparent p-independence of σ2/N at z=zc further reinforces our view
that this value of z is in some deep sense critical.  Varying p amounts to varying the stochasticity of
the evolutionary process.  That the value of σ2/N is independent of p at z=zc suggests that at z=zc,
there are critical fluctuations so that the value of p is largely irrelevant.
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Given that these surprising and intricate dynamics occur in such a simple system, one is naturally
led to ask whether they are general.  If we believe that minority games capture some essential
features of many complex adaptive systems, then we may seek to find counter-parts of the
dynamics of these games in real social and biological systems.  The period-two dynamics first
identified in the non-evolutionary games3 is a simple version of herding behavior which is very
common in many social systems.  Whether one can find manifestations of the more subtle
evolutionary dynamics in real systems remains to be seen.  But one should be optimistic, since it is
almost certainly true that the simple structure of minority games play a role, however confounded
by other effects, in a wide range of complex adaptive systems.
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 Notice also, that even if there were no selection against large values of Dh(i), a depletion of agents with small values
of Db(i) would also lead to a narrowing of the distribution of Db(i) from the high side:  In order for some agents to have
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becomes less pronounced, it becomes increasingly unlikely to find agents with very high values of Db(i).
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1  σ2/N vs z. for the adaptive, non-evolutionary case.
Fig. 2  σ2/N vs. m for with evolution N=101 and p=20%.  There are eight independent
runs for each value of m.  Each point represents the value of σ2/N averaged over
the last 50 generations of the run.  Each generation is 10,000 time step, and runs
were performed until σ2/N was sensibly constant, within fluctuations, generally
about 200 generations.  The horizontal dashed line is at the value of σ2/N for the
RCG.
Fig. 3 σ2/N vs. z for different N and m and p=20%. Each point represents the value of
σ2/N averaged over the last 50 generations of the run.  Each generation is 10,000
time step, and runs were performed until σ2/N was sensibly constant, within
fluctuations, generally about 200 generations.  The horizontal dashed line is at the
value of σ2/N for the RCG.
Fig. 4 σ2/N vs. m for N=101 and p=10%, 20% and 40%.  Each point represents the value
of σ2/N averaged over the last 50 generations of the run.  Each generation is
10,000 time step, and runs were performed until σ2/N was sensibly constant,
within fluctuations, generally about 200 generations.
Fig. 5  a.  σ2/N as a function of generation for m=3, N=101 and p=10%, 20% and 40%.
b. σ2/N as a function of generation for m=7, N=101 and p=10%, 20% and 40%.
Fig. 6  a.  σ2/N as a function of m, N=101, p=20%, s=1, 1st generation.  There are eight
independent runs for each value of m.
b. σ2/N as a function of m, N=101, p=20%, s=1, 200th generation.  There are eight
independent runs for each value of m.
Fig. 7 a.  〈Dh〉 as a function of generation for m=3 N=101, p=20%.
b.  〈Db〉 as a function of generation for m=3 N=101, p=20%.
c.  σ2/N as a function of generation for m=3 N=101, p=20%.
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Fig. 8 a.  P(1|um) for the first generation for m=3 N=101, p=20%.
b. P(1|um) for the 400th generation for m=3 N=101, p=20%.  Note that the
histogram is very nearly, but not quite, flat.
Fig. 9 POED as a function of m for the 200th generation in games played with N=101,
s=2.
Fig. 10 a.  Agent wealth vs. Dh(i) every 20 generations for m=3, N=101, p=20%.
b. Agent wealth vs. Dh(i) every 3rd generation for the first 30 generations, for
m=3, N=101, p=20%.
Fig. 11 a.  Agent wealth vs. Db(i) every 20 generations for m=3, N=101, p=20%.
b. Agent wealth vs. Db(i) every 3rd generation for the first 30 generations, for
m=3, N=101, p=20%.
Fig. 12  Db(i) vs. Dh(i) for m=3, N=101, p=20%, every 20 generations.
Fig. 13 The standard deviation of Db(i) as a function of generation for m=3, N=101,
p=20%.
Fig. 14 a.  3-d plot of agent wealth vs. Dh(i) and Db(i) after the first generation for m=3,
N=101, p=20%.
b. 3-d plot of agent wealth vs. Dh and Db after the last (400th) generation for m=3,
N=101, p=20%.  Note the different Db and wealth scales in Figs. 14a and b.
Fig. 15 a.  〈Dh〉 as a function of generation for m=7 N=101, p=20%.
b. 〈Db〉 as a function of generation for m=7 N=101, p=20%.
c.  σ2/N as a function of generation for m=7 N=101, p=20%.
Fig. 16   Agent wealth vs. Dh(i) every 20 generations for m=7, N=101, p=20%.
Fig. 17  Agent wealth vs. Db(i) every 20 generations for m=7, N=101, p=20%.
